The AssoclaUon of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN) has, from the point of view of the big powers, become an Important factor in the balance of power struggle. Political as well as economic reasons seem to suggest closer relations with the People's Republic of China.
T he five South East Asian countries which, in August 1967, founded the Association of South East Asian Nations for closer cooperation in cultural and economic affairs did in fact not have too much in common. While Thailand had never in its history suffered under colonial rule, British influence on Malaysia and Singapore was strong, Indonesia had been under the Dutch and the Philippines experienced Spanish, and later American, supremacy. Besides the Malay element there were different ethnic groups, languages, and religions, border disputes (between Malaysia and Indonesia in Sarawak), and territorial claims (the Philippines on Sabah). One wellknown and even profitable common economic enterprise, the Malaysian Singapore Airlines, split up several years ago.
ASEAN and Big Powers
The main common basis of the five nations seems to have been the fact that all of them were politically relatively weak countries enclosed between India in the West and People's China and Japan in the East. And in fact, as a result of more or less regular meetings of Ministers and high government officials of the five countries in the field of foreign policy, economic development, education, etc., ASEAN gradually became an important institution for the exchange of ideas and, from the viewpoint of the big powers, a group of states representing an increasing weight in the balance of power struggle.
Whereas the United Kingdom pulled out of the region East of Suez, thereby initiating a fivepower defence agreement between Australia, New Zealand, and the UK to protect Malaysia and Singapore, Japan's economic interests in this region, where it can buy its raw materials and find customers for its products, are considerable. Apart from the aspect of the Overseas Chinese in South East Asia, which will be discussed later on, the significance of the ASEAN countries for the People's Republic of China is mainly determined by the political role the United States and the Soviet Union intend to play in the area ~.
Despite the Nixon Doctrine of 1969, the long-term object of which is to "Asianize" the problems of the continent and to withdraw entirely from Vietnam, the United States still regard South East Asia as an important factor in the maintenance of the balance of power in Asia. Therefore, they consider it necessary to enhance the stabilization of this region in the economic, social, political, and military fields so as to suppress, as far as possible, communist influence, be it from Peking or from Moscow. From the American point of view, relations with the Philippines have traditionally been, and still are, good. This is also substantially true of relations with Thailand, which was economically supported by the US during the Vietnam war. To the Indonesia of President Suharto, Washington is again a partner welcome as an assistant in the development of the country, while under Sukarno, who lent more towards Peking and Indonesian Communist Party, it had been the enemy No. 1. Peking is a careful observer of the diminution of American presence in South East Asia which started in the early seventies. While opposing a strong American influence in this region, China is sure that a complete retreat of the USA would open the path for the USSR, which would be only too glad to fill the gap.
Inclusion In the Chinese Sphere of Interest
By propagating the Breshnev Doctrine, Moscow has been trying since 1969 to build up a collective security system in Asia which to some extent comes close to Malaysia's proposal to neutralize South East Asia. However, while Malaysia's objective is to prevent the region from becoming ASEAN the scene of a permanent struggle between the big powers to secure more influence, the USSR may see a chance to fill the vacuum left by the British and also -to some extent -by the United States, at the same time trying to increase its own influence and possibly contain China. This, and especially the fact that the ASEAN countries' geographical position is closer to China than to any other of the big powers, practically forces Peking to include South East Asia in its own sphere of interest. All fears that People's China might invade countries of South East Asia have, however, proved unjustified. On the other hand, the attempts to secure influence in the ASEAN countries by supporting the local communist movements have on the whole been doomed to failure. Indonesia, whose relations with Peking had been close during the last years of President Sukarno's rule, has turned against People's China since September 30, 1965. As Peking may well fear that any support of the revolutionary movements in the various countries of the region might induce the governments in power in the ASEAN countries to seek closer relations with the USA or the USSR, its interest in good official relations with those countries is growing steadily and prospects are bright for China's establishing (or -in the case of Indonesia -resuming) diplomatic relations with the five South East Asian countries. The fact that they have so far hesitated to take this step may be attributed to their fear of Chinese communism and also -to some extent -to their insecurity regarding the reactions of the Overseas Chinese in the various countries, who might well take a chauvinistic attitude.
The Role of Chinese Minorities
There is one link between China and the countries of the region, which exists with no other big power: each of the five South East Asian countries has a more or less substantial number of residents of Chinese origin. The local distribution of the Overseas Chinese in South East Asia varies considerably from country to country. Here are some estimates from the sixties 2. At that time, Thailand accounted for 2.6 mn Overseas Chinese (8.5 p.c. of its total population). The figures for Indonesia then were between 2.6 and 2.75 mn (2.6 p.c.) and for the Philippines, between 0.18 and 0.45 mn (about 1.4 p.c. of the total population). In Singapore and Malaysia the Overseas Chinese are by far the largest ethnic group, with between 1.25 and 1.4 mn and between 2.89 and 3.3 mn respectively, the proportion in the total population being about 75 p.c. and 35 p.c. respectively. The Overseas Chinese in South East Asia have, however, a far greater importance than the bare figures would suggest, because economically they are the most active part of the population. This has aroused the antagonism of the other ethnic groups. A good example of this is Indonesia where Chinese immigration took place in the 19th and 20th centuries. Not allowed to acquire land, the immigrants turned to commercial and industrial activities and because of their ability and special position became intermediaries between the colonial rulers and the native population. This added to their being regarded as foreigners even after having lived in the country for two generations and becoming Indonesian citizens.
Peking took a natural interest in the question of citizenship and in 1960 permitted those who preferred Chinese to Indonesian citizenship to return to Mainland China. This led to an exodus from Indonesia of more than 100,000 Chinese during the sixties. However, the problem was not solved. When Indonesia turned strictly anti-communist and anti-Peking after September 30, 1965, the Indonesian government took steps against the resident Chinese. They were widely regarded as communist sympathizers, because they had been backed by the Indonesian Communist Party during the periods of discrimination.
Discrimination against Overseas Chinese
This is an illustration of the dislike and suspicion to which the Overseas Chinese are generally exposed in South East Asia and which tends to increase whenever problems arise. As far as the Indonesian Communist Party is concerned, it should be noted, however, that it was founded as early as 1920 and totalled about 3 million members in 1964, which makes it the largest communist party outside the socialist countries. The vast majority of its members were, of course, not Chinese.
It is quite natural that Peking opposes all discrimination against Overseas Chinese in South East Asia, so we cannot be surprised that the various countries are under the impression that China interferes with their domestic affairs.
It has often been suggested that the Overseas Chinese might be used by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) as a political instrument for subversive actions in the respective countries.
Stephen Fitzgerald seems to have come to a plausible answer to this: "... it was precisely because of their special relationship with China and their position in the countries of residence that the Overseas Chinese were both a liability in establishing or developing 2 Stephen Fitzgerald, China and the Overseas Chinese, A Study of Peking's Changing Policy 1949 -1970 , Cambridge 1972 .
